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ABSTRACT
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a pathway to positive and sus-tainable engagement of business-stakeholders in general and its host 
community in particular, especially when the operations of such enterprise 
have a way of negatively impacting the environment or other interests of 
such a community. Empirical research has shown that such engagement has 
a way of not just improving corporate-community relations but acts as a 
strategic roadmap to allow stakeholders take ownership of and buy in into 
corporate sustainability plans. This is one area International Oil Companies 
(IOCs) operating in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region have arguably floundered, 
and hence the ensuing and seemingly intractable confrontations from the 
host communities and militant groups who perennially feel left out of top-
down CSR initiatives.
This paper discusses the concept of “emotional equity” as a missing piece 
in community involvement in corporate sustainability in Nigeria. It examines 
how a stakeholder approach to CSR could serve as a participatory and level 
playing approach that would engender peaceful, symbiotic engagement and 
cohabitation between the IOCs and their host communities.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, development, environment,  pol-
lution
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The commercial production of oil in Nigeria commenced in 1958 fol-lowing the discovery of crude oil at Oloibiri by Shell British Petroleum 
(now Royal Dutch Shell) in 1956.1 The discovery was preceded by search 
for crude oil sometime in 1908, when a German company – the Nigerian 
Bitumen Corporation explored for oil in parts of the present Ondo and 
Ogun states of Nigeria.2 Nigeria produces about 93.1 million metric tons of 
oil annually and accounts for 2.9% of world production.3 The entire annual 
production comes from the Niger Delta and the sea off its shores. The oil 
and gas industry accounts for at least 80% of Nigeria’s annual revenue. 
The largest of the companies is Anglo Dutch Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC), which accounts for 42.2% of the daily output, followed 
by Mobil (US) 21.2%, Agip (Italy) 7.5%, Elf (now Total) 6.1 % (France), 
Texaco Overseas Petroleum, now Chevron (US) 2.6% and others account-
ing for 1.7%.4 Each is in joint venture partnership with the state-owned Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) that commands 55-60% of shares 
but has little or no contact with the communities in the region.5
The Niger Delta is one of the “10 most important wetland and coastal 
marine ecosystems in the world” with a population of about 31 million 
people.6 It is also the location of massive oil and gas deposits and has been 
reputed to have generated an estimated $600 billion since the 1960s.7 De-
spite this, the majority of the Niger Delta’s population lives in poverty. The 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) describes the region as 
suffering from “administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and 
services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and 
1. Amnesty International, Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and poverty in the Niger Delta (2009 
Amnesty International Publications) 11. 
2 F Ayodele-Akaakar “Oil and gas – the issue of ownership and the Nigerian situation” 2 
(1997) Federal Inland Revenue Service Bulletin 61-81.
3 B Ejobowah “Who owns the oil? the politics of ethnicity in the Niger Delta of Nigeria” 
(2000) 47/1 Africa Today 29-47 available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187306> last 
accessed 02 December 2009.
4 Ibid.
5 V Willem and J Moerkamp “The Niger Delta: a disrupted ecology, the role of Shell and 
other oil companies” (a discussion Paper by Greenpeace, Netherland) quoted ibid.
6 Niger Delta Technical Committee report (November 2008) 102. Figure is based on the 
2006 Census, quoted in Amnesty International  Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution, above at 
note 29 at 9.
7 G Wurthmann “Ways of using the African oil boom for sustainable development” (African 
Development Bank, Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 84, March 2006) quot-
ed ibid.
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squalor, and endemic conflict.”8 The Majority of the people of the Niger 
Delta do not have adequate access to clean water or health-care. Their pov-
erty, and its contrast with the wealth generated by oil, has become one of the 
world’s starkest and most disturbing examples of the “resource curse’ con-
cept”. In 2011, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) did 
a multi-disciplinary examination on the state of the environment in Ogo-
niland.9 The report10 showed the depth of contamination which has affected 
public health,11 the aquatic habitat,12 vegetation.13
The wave of crises and criminality, carnage, oil theft (“illegal bunker-
ing”), kidnapping and other indicators of insecurity and lawlessness in the 
oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria (preceding the “amnesty” regime that 
ushered in a new and yet seemingly unsustainable regime of cessation of 
hostility) has ignited the concern of stakeholders. These include the govern-
ments of the states constituting the Niger Delta,14 Government of the Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria, the international oil companies, the international 
buyers of Nigeria’s oil,15 the Niger Delta communities and even the non-oil 
producing states of Nigeria. The uneasiness that pervades this region is not 
in the interest of any of the above stakeholders. Governments at all levels 
in Nigeria have significant lost royalty and tax revenue as a result of this 
crisis.16 The oil companies have severally, experienced decline in profitabil-
8 United Nations Development Programme Niger Delta Human Development Report (2006) 
<web.ng.undp.org/reports/nigeria_hdr_report.pdf> at 9, last accessed 24 June 2014.  
9 Comprising of several local governments in Rivers state which form part of the Niger Delta 
region.
10 United Nations Environmental Programme, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland 
(2011, UNEP Kenya).
11 It was reported pertaining a particular community that “... members at Nisisioken Ogale 
are drinking water from wells that is (sic) contaminated with benzene, a known  carcin-
ogen, at levels over 900 times above the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline.” 
Excess benzene exposure, which causes cancer, was also been reported in the areas affected 
by the oil pollution. Ibid at 11.
12 The spate of oil pollution has negatively impacted the fish life-cycle, root crops, such as cas-
sava, will become unusable; “oil spill occurs on land, fires often break out, killing vegetation 
and creating a crust over the land, making remediation or revegetation difficult” – ibid at 10.
13 When farming recommences, plants generally show signs of stress and yields are reportedly 
lower than in non-impacted areas. When oil spill occurs on land, it usually results in inferno, 
killing vegetation and creating a crust over the land, making remediation or revegetation 
difficult. “In Bodo West, in Bonny LGA, an increase in artisanal refining between 2007 and 
2011 has been accompanied by a 10% loss of healthy mangrove cover, or 307,381 m2. If 
left unchecked, this may lead to irreversible loss of mangrove habitat in this area”. See ibid.
14 These states are Rivers, Cross River, Delta, Bayelsa, AkwaIbom, Abia, Ondo, Edo and Imo. 
15 With the United States of America leading as the largest importer of Nigeria’s oil with 44%; 
Europe - 10%. See US Energy Information Administration at <www.eia.doe.gov/Z:/News-
CABs/V6/Nigeria/Full.html> last accessed  June 14, 2009.
16 The Nigerian economy is heavily dependent on the oil sector, which, according to the World 
Bank, accounts for over 95 per cent of export earnings and about 85 per cent of govern-
ment revenues - ibid. 
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ity and loss of technical personnel (especially expatriates who have either 
rejected offer to work in the Niger Delta or relocated elsewhere, after ab-
duction and payment of ransom – in some instances). The host communities 
have not fared any better, because of the ineffective approaches by govern-
ments in handling their concerns; and oil companies that are accused of 
paying lips service to CSR and environmental protection. 
This is arguably due to the fact that CSR efforts have not created 
level-playing fields for genuine discussion and feedback from indigenous 
communities on how best to tailor such CSR interventions to meet their 
immediate and pressing needs. This absence of emotional equity and level 
playing discussions in framing CSR efforts must be addressed if corporate 
interventions in indigenous and societal problems through the CSR are to 
provide meaningful results. This paper discusses stakeholder oriented CSR 
as an alternative all-inclusive solution to improve the relationship of the ba-
sic stakeholders and hence enhance the evolving of a symbiotic correlation 
regime among them. 
The paper is divided into six parts. After this introduction, part two 
analyses and discusses the theoretical basis of the CSR concept, while part 
three x-rays some of the practical applications of the CSR concept in Nige-
ria. It focuses on efforts of corproations such as Shell, Total and Chevron 
aimed at responding to sustainability concerns in the Nigeria Delta. Part 
four discusses the lack of genuine stakeholder engagements as the chief rea-
son why some of these efforts have not yielded desired results. Part five dis-
cusses the importance of genuine stakeholder consultation by corporations 
in developing effective CSR programs. The paper concludes in part six.
2. THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE  
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
There is yet to emerge an all-encircling definition of CSR.17 Notably, what informs every definition at a point in time is the perspective or 
the school of thought to which a writer belongs. The term Corporate Social 
Responsibility came into common use in the early 1970s and the term stake-
holder, meaning those impacted by an organization’s activities, was used to 
17 D Votaw “Genius becomes rare: a comment on the doctrine of corporate social responsibil-
ity” (1973) quoted in D Campbell, et al “Corporate philanthropy in the U.K.: 1985-2000: 
some empirical findings” (2002) 1/2 Journal of Business Ethics 29-41 <http://www.jstor.org/
stable/25074816> last accessed November 4, 2009; CA Williams and RV Aguilera Corporate 
Social Responsibility in a Comparative Perspective (2007, Spi publisher Services) at 461.
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describe corporate owners beyond shareholders as a result of an influential 
book by R Freeman in 1984.18 Muniapan and Dass, for instance, look at 
CSR in the following light:
CSR refers to the obligation of an organisation, which considers 
the interests of all their stakeholders, which includes the custom-
ers, employees, shareholders, communities and ecological consid-
erations in all aspects of their operations. This obligation is seen to 
extend beyond their statutory obligation to comply with legislation. 
CSR goes beyond the normal charity activities of an organisation 
and this requires that the responsible organisation take (sic) into 
full account of its impact on all stakeholders and on the environ-
ment when making decisions. In a nutshell, CSR requires the or-
ganisations to balance the needs of all stakeholders with its need to 
make a profit and reward shareholders adequately.19
The above concept of CSR is based on the stakeholder approach be-
ing canvassed in this paper. The approach helps other stakeholders assume 
emotional attachment or stake in the sustainability of such corporate entity. 
Ordinarily, men and women protect and guard whatever they own or have 
beneficial interest in. This conceptualisation when juxtaposed on the CSR 
benchmark set by the United Nations Global Compact,20 shows that it is en-
compassed in the Global Compact principles of CSR.21 Carroll, on the other 
hand views CSR as: “[T]he social responsibility of business [that] encom-
passes the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that so-
ciety has of organizations at a given point in time.”22 Carroll demonstrates 
18 R Freeman Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984, Pitman) available at 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_social_responsibility> last accessed  April 14, 
2009.
19 B Muniapan and M Dass “Corporate social responsibility: a philosophical approach from 
an ancient Indian perspective” (2008) 1/4 International Journal of Indian Culture and Busi-
ness Management 412.
20 United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) is a voluntary, personal initiative of Kofi Annan, 
former UN Secretary General that is aimed at incorporating the values   of CSR into busi-
ness launched in collaboration with Multinational Corporations in 1999.
21 The Global Compact sets out ten principles that should underscore the CSR initiatives of 
MNCs, which include: human rights protection, labour relations, environmental sustaina-
bility, and anti-corruption drive.
22 AB Carroll “A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social performance” 
(1979) 4/4 Academy of Management Review at 500, quoted in F Tuzzolino and BR Arman-
di “A need-hierarchy framework for assessing corporate social responsibility”; (1981) 6/1 
The Academy of Management Review <http://www.jstor.org/stable/257137> last accessed 
November 4, 2009.
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this using what he calls the CSR pyramid.23 The discretionary (philanthro-
py) pyramid is concerned with doing good to the society for the sake of 
mankind.24 The legal pyramid is hinged on merely complying with the law, 
for example, by paying taxes.25 This pyramid is arguably not a part of CSR 
because that would neutralise the ‘social’ component of this philosophy. 
Obeying law is not optional in CSR proceedings, which  are not normally 
backed by formal sanctions. While the economic pyramid is predicated on 
the profit maximising core concern of business. As Peter Drucker puts it, “... 
the proper ‘social responsibility’ of business is to tame the dragon, that is to 
turn a social problem into economic opportunity and economic benefit, into 
productive capacity, into human competence, into well paid jobs, and into 
wealth”.26 And lastly, the ethical pyramid sees CSR in terms of those activi-
ties that are based on their adherence to a set of ethical or moral standards 
or principles. Carroll considers the ethical domain as activities or practices 
that are expected or prohibited by members of society although not codified 
into law. They are responsibilities which “embody those standards, norms 
or expectations that reflect a concern for what consumers, employees, share-
holders, and the community regard as fair, just, or in keeping with the re-
spect or protection of stakeholders’ moral rights.”27
The above definitions capture the postulation of the right-wing propo-
nents or school of thought of CSR (social matrix group: stakeholder/vol-
untary/communitarian approach). However, to the adherents of a converse 
group, under the classical school of thought (orthodox paradigm/“con-
tractarian” approach), CSR, as posited by one of its most vocal advocates, 
23 ibid at 497.
24 The word “philanthropy” is rooted in Greek and means “love of mankind.”The early phi-
lanthropists, were believed to have been motivated by the drive to “apply their wealth 
to the discovery of the underlying causes of personal distress, and to the formulation of 
strategies to rid the world of such systemic scourges”. See SN Katz “Philanthropy” Work-
ing Paper presented at Princeton University, 2004 quoted in A Gan “The impact of public 
scrutiny on corporate philanthropy” (2006) 69/3 Journal of Business Ethics 217 <http://
www.jstor.org/stable/25123952> last accessed June 17, 2010.
25 This perspective would appear to have influenced IOCs in Nigeria like Shell and Chevron 
who claim that the payment of tax, and other statutory payments to governments and its 
agencies amounted to CSR practice.
26 P Drucker “The new meaning of corporate social responsibility” (1982) 26 California 
Management 53-63 quoted in AB Carroll “Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a 
Definitional Construct” (1999) 38/3 Business and Society 268-295.
27 A Caroll “The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: toward the moral management 
of organizational stakeholders” (1991) Business Horizons 39-48, quoted in MS Schwartz 
and AB Carroll “Corporate social responsibility: a three-domain approach” (2003) 13/4 
Business Ethics Quarterly 503-530  <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3857969> last accessed 8 
April 2010 at 508.
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Milton Friedman,28 is hinged on the fact that, “the social responsibility of 
business is to increase its profits”, subject to “conforming to the basic rules 
of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom.”29 The viewpoint of this school adopts all but one of the pyramids 
of Carroll: philanthropy. It would appear the postulation of this school of 
thought as captured by their unquestionable frontline promoter, Milton 
Friedman, does not reflect the real essence of this concept. Mere complying 
with rules cannot guarantee corporate sustainability or the long run attain-
ment of the goals of any corporation, especially in a volatile business milieu 
like Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. It is apparent that this morally unsus-
tainable philosophy is the driving force behind corporate decisions of some 
IOCs with the “contractarian” CSR belief in the Niger Delta.
CSR principles or policies vary from one company to the other, but ba-
sically include: minimising damage to the environment and enhancing “sus-
tainable” business development, i.e. business growth that has minimal long 
term consequences on the environment and natural resources; having liberal 
employment policies; investing money in local communities; and helping 
fight crime in society.30 The concept of CSR sprang up from the need for 
business entities not just to focus on making profit for their shareholders, 
but as a matter of fact balance the interest of the various stakeholders, in-
cluding the shareholders, employees, host communities, governments, sup-
pliers, amongst others.
International CSR Principles
International organizations such as the United Nations, have over the years 
engaged MNCs and IOCs, in dialogue that resulted in the formation of 
some guiding principles, outside of the normal legal requirements, so as to 
enhance smooth and ethical operations of such corporations. Some of these 
principles are considered below:
28 M Friedman “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” (1970)  The 
New York Times (New York) at 122–126, quoted in R R Kerr “The Meaning of Corporate 
social Responsibility” available at <www.nzbr.org.nz/documents/speeches/...96.../aiesec.
doc.htm>.
29 RR Kerr, ibid.
30 Ibid at 241
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A. Ruggie Framework
The United Nations in 2011 adopted the UN Guiding Principles on Busi-ness and Human Rights formulated by Prof. John Ruggie,31 also known 
as the Ruggie Framework as a benchmark for measuring the CSR of busi-
ness to respect human rights, and allied responsibilities. It is basically hinged 
on a tripod of stakeholder-responsibilities: state has the responsibility to 
protect human rights, while business is duty bound to respect human rights 
and a provision for access to remedy for victims.32 A business enterprise 
is therefore required to act with due diligence by identifying and avoiding 
adverse human rights impacts and remedying them, should it be involved in 
breaching them.33
The need for this kind of framework arose as a result of inability of 
governments to through laws and formal policies regulate the excesses and 
complexities of business, especially multinational companies operating in 
the extractive industry and others that produce or operate “sweat shops” 
in developing countries because of cheap labour, poor standards and weak 
regulations.34 
31 In June 2011, John Ruggie, United Nations Special Representative on Business and Human 
Rights, presented to the UN Human Rights Council his Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, the result of his six-year study on business and human rights. See D Schoemak-
er, “Raising the Bar on human Rights: What the Ruggie Principles Mean for Responsible 
Investors” 2011 <> last accessed 28 May 2014.
32 Econsense, “Putting the Ruggie-Framework and the Guiding Principles into Practice”, Busi-
ness and Human Rights Workshop held in Berlin, Germany on 15th April, 2013, 2.
33 Lindsay R, et al, “Human Rights Responsibilities in the Oil and Gas Sector: Applying the 
UN Guiding Principles” (2013) 6(1) Journal of World Energy Law and Business 13 http://
jwelb.oxfordjournals.org/  last accessed 1 June 2014.
34 A typical example of this is the Nike sweatshop scandal. Nike is one of the biggest sports 
wear manufacturing companies in the world. It does not operate its own factories, but 
engages factories especially in the developing countries to produce shoes they design. In the 
70s Nike produced its shoes using Pakistanis, Taiwanese and Korean contractors, but with 
the organisation of labour in those territories, they moved their operations to less regulated 
territories like China, Vietnam, Pakistan and Indonesia. The Nike contracting companies 
were accused of child labour and paying below subsistence wages. It was accused of being 
one of the evils of globalisation because of accusations of child labour, poor wages (“star-
vation wages”). The report of this sparked protests in USA, which made Nike to reverse 
some of their corporate policies, even though they did not directly engaged the workforce 
that was exploited. The shoe manufacturing company exploited the pervasive poverty in 
those territories to their advantage, and this was made possible because of the weak legal 
framework and enforcement mechanisms in those territories as it is the case with most de-
veloping countries. See Nike: The Sweat Shop Debate <faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/mefford/
ugba178_files/Nike_Sweatshop.pdf> last accessed 24 June 2014.
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B. OECD Principles on CSR
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2001 found 246 codes of conduct to promote global corporate re-
sponsibility.35 These OECD Guidelines are recommendations addressed 
by governments to multinational enterprises operating in or from member 
countries.36 These centre on voluntary principles and standards for respon-
sible business conduct in various areas including employment and industrial 
relations, human rights, environment, information disclosure, competition, 
taxation, and science and technology.37 Although these Guidelines were 
made with contributions from business and labour, they are a more of gov-
ernmental effort targeted at identifying Transnational Corporations (TNC) 
conduct standards that are consistent with “good corporate citizenship”.38
In what they refer to as “weak governance zones,”39 the OECD’s Busi-
ness and Industry Advisory Committee recommends that “All companies 
have the same responsibilities in weak governance zones as they do else-
where. They are expected to obey the law, even if it is not enforced, and to 
respect the principles of relevant international instruments where national 
law is absent.”40
C. UN Global Compact
The former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan while addressing the 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 
challenged world business leaders to help build the social and environmental 
pillars that would sustain the new global economy and make globalisation 
work for all the peoples of the world. His vision is for a “global pact of 
shared values and principles that will give the global market a human face.”41 
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) is a voluntary, personal initiative of 
35 SA Aaronson “Minding our business: what the United States government has done and can 
do to ensure that U.S. multinationals act responsibly in foreign markets” (2005) 59/1/2 
Journal of Business Ethics <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25123550> last accessed 8 April 
2010.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid at 180.
38 UNCTAD The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, above at note 44 at 44.
39 JG Ruggie “Business and human rights: the evolving international agenda” (2007) 101/4 The 
American Journal of International Law 819-840 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40006320> 
last accessed 17 June 2010.
40 Ibid.
41 Available at  at <http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?hl=en&q=author: %22Na-
tions %22+intitle:%22The+social+responsibility+of+transnational+corpora-
tions%22+&um=1&ie=UTF-8&oi=scholarr>.
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Kofi Annan, which is aimed at incorporating the values of CSR into business.
The 10 Global Compact Principles amongst other things emphasise Hu-
man Rights Standard: businesses should support and respect human rights 
with international flavour; and not in complicit association with or partici-
pating in a questionable act or a crime. Labour Relations: businesses should 
uphold the freedom of association, right to collective bargaining in labour 
relations; the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour, child 
labour, elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupa-
tion. Environmental Sustainability: businesses should support a precaution-
ary principle on environment, promote greater environmental responsibility 
initiatives, and encourage the development and diffusion of environmental-
ly-friendly technology and Anti-Corruption Drive: businesses should work 
against all forms of corruption, including extortion and bribery.
The Global Compact has become the world’s largest corporate social 
responsibility initiative, with about three thousand participating companies 
and forty national networks. It is commendable for its extensive involve-
ment of developing-countries companies.42 The purpose of the all-inclusive 
responsibility regime is plausible as it encourages companies to evolve in-
ternal and ethical environmental sustainability programmes with a view to 
encouraging a good stakeholders’ relationship.
B. Sullivan Principles
The Sullivan Principles promote business support for human rights, economic justice, racial and gender equality, sustainable development 
and a healthy environment.43 While compliance is voluntary, the code com-
manded enough moral and corporate support to encourage many US firms 
to sign it. An independent monitoring procedure exists to grade corporate 
compliance and issue annual reports.
The Global Sullivan CSR Principles is a private initiative for a voluntary 
code of conduct. They were articulated by Reverend Leon Sullivan in 1999 
and has so far been accepted by many MNCs.44 Some IOCs have signed 
42 JG Ruggie Business And Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, above at note 
123 at 850.
43 PH Rudolph, “The Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enter-
prises” in R. Mullerat (ed) Corporate Social Responsibility: The Corporate Governance of 
the 21st (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2005) 250; Century Chevron, Developing 
Partnerships, above at 65.
44 R Shamir “Between self-regulation and the alien tort claims act: on the contested concept 
of corporate social responsibility” (2004) 38/4 Law and Society Review <http://www.jstor.
org/stable/1555086> last accessed 25 June 2010.
164          Afe Babalola University: Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy Vol. 4 Iss. 1 (2014)
the US Sullivan Principles Act – Chevron has long supported it, so also has 
Exxon Mobil45 and Shell expressed support for these principles. Between 
1986 and 1996, the signatories to the Sullivan principles jointly donated the 
sum of $30 million to community affairs directed at helping South Africa’s 
black population.
E. World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)
The WBCSD was formed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 by business lead-ers from different sectors.46 This organisation supports the view that 
a coherent CSR strategy based on sound ethics and core values offers clear 
business benefits. This accrues from adopting a broader world view, which 
enables business to monitor shifts in social expectations and helps control 
risk and identify market opportunities. Such strategy helps to align corpo-
rate and societal values, thus improving reputation of business and main-
taining public support.47
Corporations sometimes advertise their compliance with evolving CSR 
standards to gain favourable public reputation, particularly on environmen-
tal issues that involve recycling, forestry management, chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFC)-free products, dolphin friendly tuna fishing or no animal testing pol-
icies. Some surveys show roughly one-half or more of customers claim that 
their product purchases are influenced by this “ethical” consideration.48
From the foregoing, it is obvious that all or virtually every IOC in the Ni-
ger Delta has subscribed to or supports major international ethical, though 
voluntary, codes of corporate behaviour (specifically in relation to CSR) and 
yet do not uphold these principles in their operations, especially wherever 
they operate in developing countries and in Niger Delta in particular. These 
principles basically address issues relating to human rights, environmental 
sustainability, labour conditions and relation, community involvement and 
developmental issues, among others. This shows a lip service to their oper-
ational behaviour. It has established through empirical research that TNCs, 
45 Business in the Community available at <http://www.bitc.org.uk/applications/members/di-
rectory/sector.rm?name=Oil%20%26%20Gas> last accessed 25 June 2010.
46 UNCTAD The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, above at note 44 at 32
47 WBCSD, “Corporate social responsibility: meeting changing expectations” (2000) quoted 
in VM Panapanaan, et al “Roadmapping corporate social responsibility in Finnish compa-
nies” (2003) 44/2/3 Journal of Business Ethics 135.
48 A Wild “A review of corporate citizenship and social initiatives”; (prepared for the Bu-
reau for Employers’ Activities, International Labour Organisation, New York, 1-2 October 
1998) quoted in UNCTAD The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, above 
at note 44 at 23.
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especially those in the extractive industry show a lower standard of recog-
nition and compliance to issues of human rights, environmental standards 
and protection, labour and developmental concerns in developing countries 
compared to North America and Europe by exploiting the frail social and 
environmental standards and regulatory competence in these countries.49
3. PHILANTROPHY-BASED NOTIONS OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The prevailing approach to CSR in Nigeria for many years was the phil-anthropic approach. For example, when confronted with the issue of 
CSR, IOCs were fast to point to the fact that they are in business and not 
charitable organisations.50 This hard stand on CSR however appears to be 
thawing as most of the IOCs have through collaborations with some com-
munities set up General Memoranda of Understanding (GMOUs) which 
address some of the infrastructural challenges of the host communities. At 
present, many of the IOCs invest in community development activities to a 
great extent, but considering the extreme poverty, deprivation and degrada-
tion in the area, most of such efforts are arguably palliative and tokenistic.51 
To outright condemn the IOCs for totally not initiating or undertaking 
CSR activities in the Niger Delta would however amount to an unfair and 
non-factual description of the position of things as they stand in the region. 
As has earlier been noted in this paper, the question is not whether they 
undertake CSR activities but that of the degree of responsiveness to com-
munity concern and the approaches adopted in doing same. An examination 
of the CSR of four major IOCs in the Niger Delta shows the below result:
49 M Bowen “Shell in Nigeria: corporate social responsibility and the Ogoni Crisis” 20 Car-
negie Council on Ethics and International Affairs 1; MS Schwartz and AB Carroll MS 
Schwartz and AB Carroll Corporate Social Responsibility, above at note 14 at 517; VM 
Strike, et al “Being good while being bad : social responsibility and international diversifica-
tion of US firms” 37/6 Journal of International Business Studies; P Low and A Yeats “Three 
lenses on multinational enterprise: politics, corruption and corporate social responsibility” 
(2006) Palgrave Macmillan Journals 850 <http://www,jstor.org/stable/4540388,accessed> 
08 April 2010; P Low “Do ‘dirty’ industries migrate?” (1992) in P Low (ed) “International 
trade and the environment” (Washington, DC: World Bank) 89-104; and REB Lucas, et 
al “Economic development, environmental regulation and the international migration of 
toxic industrial pollution: 1960-1988” (1992) in P Low (ed), ibid.
50 UNCTAD, “The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations” <http://scholar.
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A. Shell Petroleum Development Company
Undoubtedly, Shell has made enormous contributions to the economic growth of Nigeria and the development of local communities in the 
Niger Delta. 
Shell is reputed to have contributed in these areas: support for small 
business growth, agriculture, training, education, health care and capacity 
building, etc. Shell companies in Nigeria52 are also helping develop young 
talents by sponsoring a research programme in five universities for core 
technical skills in geosciences.53 Even though this appears like a strategic 
investment which the company may in the long run benefit from in terms of 
skilled manpower, it is still commendable.
In 2013 and 2012 respectively, the sum of $104.1 million $103.2 was 
spent by the company as its contribution to community development proj-
ects.54 Shell’s CSR is centred around their three global strategic themes of en-
terprise development, road safety and energy access, and on locally tailored 
programmes covering community development, disaster relief, education, 
health and biodiversity.55 In 2011, Shell’s community investment amounted 
to $76.3 million which was directly invested by  SPDC and SNEPCo to-
wards addressing social and economic development challenges in the region 
in the following areas: education, community health, enterprise develop-
ment for youths and women, and community-driven development initiatives 
via the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU) between SPDC 
and communities.56 In 2008, SPDC and the joint venture partners contribut-
ed directly a further $84 million (Shell’s share of $25.2 million) to commu-
nity development projects, many of which were undertaken in partnership 
with other organizations or government and international agencies.57 In 
2007, the SPDC joint venture contributed another $68million to commu-
52 Shell Petroleum Development Company Limited (SPDC), Shell Nigeria Exploration and 
Production Company Limited(SNEPCO), Shell Nigeria Oil Products (SNOP) and  Shell 
Nigeria Gas Ltd.
53 Shell in Nigeria “Nigerian Content: Spreading Wealth and Developing Talent” May 2009 
< http://www-static.shell.com/static/nga/downloads/pdfs/briefing_notes/nigerian_content.
pdf> last accessed 12 December 2012.
54 Shell, “Sustainability Report: Royal Dutch Shell Plc Sustainability Report 2013” <reports.
shell.com/sustainability-report/2013/.../entire_shell_sr13.pdf> pp. 23, 34; Shell, “Sustaina-
bility Report: Royal Dutch Shell Plc Sustainability Report 2012” <s00.static-shell.com/.../
dam/shell.../pdf/sustainability-report-2012-en.pdf> p. 22 last accessed 12 June 2014.
55 Ibid at 34.
56 Shell, “Improving Lives in the Niger Delta” (April 2012) <http://www-static.shell.com/
static/nga/downloads/pdfs/briefing_notes/improving_lives.pdf> last accessed 12 December 
2012.
57 Shell “Our Economic Contribution” (May 2009) 1.
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nity development projects, many of which were delivered in partnership 
with government agencies, companies, local and international NGOs, and 
the UNDP.58 In 2006, it introduced Global Memoranda of Understanding 
(GMOUs) to improve its relations with communities which has helped a 
great deal in fostering a better business-community relations. In 2003, Shell 
spent $60 million on community development to generate employment and 
calm “restive youth”.59 Shell also offers sabbaticals and student internships 
at their offices in Port Harcourt to “introduce new concepts in underground 
evaluation techniques using the latest technologies.”60
From Shell’s standpoint as can be gleaned from their reports, making 
financial provision for community development is all CSR entails. It is com-
mendable however that it is making arrangements with other stakeholders 
like suppliers and other service providers which extend to arrangements that 
soften the procedure for obtaining loans by those companies from commer-
cial banks to enable them undertake engineering and allied procurements 
for Shell.61 However, they need to prioritise their corporate environmental 
responsibility (SER) as an organisation. Shell still flares gas in large quantity 
despite yearly expression of commitment to convert them for economic use. 
The new technology that it is engaging for the purpose of curbing flaring 
is majorly used in terrains like Canada and US where the regulatory and 
enforcement mechanisms are functional.
B. Chevron 
Chevron has consistently argued that it has boosted local economies and created direct and indirect jobs by training and employing a sizeable 
workforce. It also asserts that it invested nearly $44 million in 2013 in local 
community-level economic development initiatives.62 In 2011, Chevron an-
nounced it was joining the US Agency for International Development in con-
tributing $50 million to the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) Foun-
dation, which Chevron established to address the socio-economic challenges 
58 Shell “Improving lives in the Niger Delta” (2008) 1 <www.shell_nigeria_improving_lives_
niger_delta.pdf> last accessed 1 July 2009.
59 C Ifeka “Violence, market forces & militarisation in the Niger Delta” (2004) 31/99 Review 
of African Political Economy 144-150 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006948> last accessed 
17 June 2010.
60 Shell, Nigerian Content: Spreading Wealth Developing Talents, above at note 51.
61 Shell (note52) at 17.
62 Chevron, “2013 Corporate Responsibility Report” <http://www.chevron.com/documents/
pdf/corporateresponsibility/chevron_cr_report_2012.pdf.> p. 18, last accessed 12 June 
2014.
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facing the area. Chevron’s $25 million commitment is drawn from a $50 
million endowment it created in 2010 to launch the NDPI Foundation.63 
Chevron further asserts in 2009 that since 1994, it has alongside other part-
ners invested about $142 million in sustainable development projects.64 This 
would amount to an annual average spending of about $9.5 million.
Chevron has also undertaken countless community-related projects in 
Nigeria in the areas of healthcare, economic and educational programmes, 
and further provides host communities with power and drinking water, and 
electric generators.65
Between 2005 and 2006, Chevron like Shell signed GMOUs with eight 
clusters of communities and their state governments in the Niger Delta. The 
GMOUs are intended to empower communities by promoting responsible, 
participatory development; improve relationships between Chevron and 
the communities, and foster collaboration in the Niger Delta region.66 The 
GMOUs have enhanced dialogue and marginally improved business-com-
munity relations in the region.
Chevron has demonstrated its willingness to shift from a more philan-
thropic focus to a sustainable community development model of engage-
ment by giving ownership and control of Chevron-funded programs to the 
communities. This initiative is in the spirit of the stakeholder approach to 
CSR that is being canvassed by this research. What is however questionable 
is the degree of impact on the communities. It has, just like Shell built its 
CSR intervention areas: 
Our social investments aim to foster economic stability and im-
prove the quality of life in the communities where we work. We cul-
tivate strong partnerships and make strategic investments in health, 
education and economic development. We work with communities 
first to understand their needs and then to develop solutions togeth-
er that seek to remove barriers to economic growth. In 2013, we 
spent $275 million globally.67
63 O Bello “X-raying Chevron’s corporate social responsibility” (2 August 2012) Busi-
nessday (Lagos). Available at <http://www.businessdayonline.com/New/index.php?op-
tion=com_content&view=article&id=42147:x-raying-chevrons-corporate-social-responsi-
bility-&catid=67:oil&Itemid=506 > last accessed 14 December 2012.
64 Chevron, “Nigeria Fact Sheet” (March 2009) 6 <www.chevron.nig.factsheet.pdf> last ac-
cessed 15 July 2009.
65 Chevron Nigeria, “Nigeria Fact Sheet” (March 2009) <www.chevron.nigeria.factsheet.
pdf> last accessed 15 July 2009.
66 ibid.
67 Chevron, note 60 at 18.
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Chevron has also teamed up with local partners to establish Nigeria’s 
first Advanced Technology Centre for Subsurface Studies in Lagos. The cen-
tre, which opened in 2002, is equipped to conduct high-end technical stud-
ies.68 Furthermore, it has also funded the Biotechnology Centre of the Fed-
eral University of Technology Yola, Adamawa State. The centre is equipped 
to handle research and training in molecular biology, drug analysis and 
advanced agricultural technologies. Chevron paid for its construction and 
provided an endowment of $200,000 for operating expenses.69
However, while Chevron reports that between 1990-1997 it allocat-
ed US $28 million on community development and other assistance to its 
host communities, according to community members, contractors, and oil 
industry employees spoken to by Human Rights Watch, this money spent 
on “development” in the Delta has been largely misused.70 “In each host 
community the result has been the creation of an elite group which has 
benefited greatly from the presence of the oil companies, and a great mass 
of people who have seen only damage to their livelihood.”71 This approach 
of settling some elites or traditional rulers without having to initiate projects 
or engage stakeholders with a view to collectively addressing the  concerns 
of the major players spells doom for the stakeholders, particularly the IOCs 
who reportedly spent a whopping $3.7 billion on security in the region in 
2008.72 If a portion of this colossal sum is expended on CSR initiatives, 
it would reduce the rate of insecurity of the investments of the IOCs. A 
need for change of approach is hereby advocated. Chevron is commended 
however for its reducing the impact of their operations on climate change 
through reduction of GHGs (particularly methane and carbon dioxide emis-
sions). They have invested in two of the world’s largest CO2 storage projects 




70 C Bustany and D Wysham “Chevron’s alleged human rights abuses in the Niger Delta and 
involvement in Chad- Cameroon pipeline consortium highlights need for World Bank Hu-
man Rights Investment Screen” Institute for Policy Studies April 28, 2000.
71 Ibid.
72 C Ajaero “Nigeria’s lost trillions” (4 May 2009) Newswatch (Lagos) at 19.
73 Chevron, note 60 at 12-13.
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C. Total 
The Total Group notes that it declared its commitment to the sustainable development of host communities by making it one of its core values 
not just to guarantee safe operations, but because it is the right thing to do.74 
Total in 2012, strategically invested in the community, especially during 
the flooding that was considered the worst in about fifty years. It used this 
opportunity well by providing relief materials to victims, engaging in rescue 
missions, engaged youths for surveillance, etc. However, in its 2012 CSR 
report it acknowledged that the level of gas it flares and hence its GHGs 
contribution had worsened.75
In over four decades of operating in Nigeria,  Total Group self-acknowl-
edges that it “has made enormous investments in communities through con-
tributions to human development, social infrastructure such as roads, water, 
electricity, health, economic empowerment and enterprise - identifying the 
company as a responsive and responsible technical organization with a hu-
man face.”76
It has also established the Institute of Petroleum Studies (IPS), Port Har-
court, in collaboration with the University of Port Harcourt and the IFP 
School France, to provide local content in graduate training, continuing ed-
ucation, applied research and capacity building for sustainable development 
of the petroleum industry.77 On August 1, 2007 a new vision and structure 
for sustainable development came into effect with a view to achieving the 
highest form of sustainability where the communities run majority of their 
programmes through institutions and enterprises set up by themselves for 
themselves with Total’s facilitators.78 
Total does not ascribe any monetary value to its CSR activities, from 
its CSR reports examined. However, its cumulative CSR effort seems in-
adequate. The issue with this kind of theoretical commitment is that its 
gas flaring profile keeps bulging by every passing year as has always been 
acknowledged in its reports. How then do we trust their commitment to 
“consolidate the sustainable development of the host communities” beyond 
their words when oil spillage and gas flaring are still on the increase?
74 Available at <http://www.ng.total.com/04_total_nigeria_activities/0408_sustainable_devel-
opment.htm> last accessed 14 November 2010.
75 Total, “Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2012” 23-24.
76 ibid.
77 Total, “Partnership to Develop Human Capital in Nigeria’s Oil Industry”, <www.ng.total.
com/media/pdf/panonigeria909.pdf> last accessed 24 June 2014.
78 ibid.
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D. Exxon Mobil 
Exxon Mobil like Total does not make specific financial implications of its CSR activities, considering its publicly accessible CSR records. For 
instance, in its 2007 community investment by geographic area, its interna-
tional headquarters report on CSR shows that it expended $31.6 million on 
CSR in Africa as a whole.79 There is no breakdown to show what specific 
CSR it undertook in the Niger Delta and their financial worth. This makes 
it difficult to  quantify such CSR efforts and the impacts they have had on 
local communities. This paper agrees with Jon Birger Skaerseth, et al80 that, 
…the company literature of TotalFinaElf [now Total] and Exxon-
Mobil pays less attention to CSR than does that of BP and Shell. 
The two latter companies also appear to frame their sphere of re-
sponsibility in broader terms than TotalFinaElf and ExxonMobil 
do. For example, all companies declare their support of the Univer-
sal Declaration on Human Rights, but only BP and Shell support 
the Sullivan Principles (voluntary business codes).81
4. EMOTIONAL EQUITY AS A CSR BUY-IN STRATEGY
The above x-ray of CSR initiatives show that local communities have not been fully incorporated into deciding on the best initiatives for them 
and how to effectively frame, design and implement them to deliver sus-
tainable results. Active stakeholders: shareholders and managements of the 
IOCs would benefit the most in the long run if this level playing engagement 
are incorporated into CSR efforts. Allowing the communities to buy into 
the IOCs by way of emotional equity investment, will make them partners 
in corporate sustainability and foster better business-community relations. 
The poor management of the disagreement between the IOCs and the host 
communities in the Niger Delta which have perennially resulted in hostili-
ties can as a matter of fact be addressed amicably within the framework of 
stakeholder approach to CSR. In Columbia, for instance, when British Pe-
troleum (BP-Amaco) faced severe criticism for the security arrangement of 
79 Exxon Mobil “Corporate Citizenship Report” (2007) 49. Available at <http://www.exxon-
mobil.com/Corporate/files/Corporate/community_ccr_2007.pdf> last accessed 14 Decem-
ber 2012.
80 JB Skaerseth, et al “Limits to corporate social responsibility: a comparative study of four 
major oil companies report”; (2004, Fridtjof Nansen Institute).
81 Ibid.
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its facilities, it turned around and engaged the community and other stake-
holders which resulted in the sustainable management framework that ad-
dressed the interest of the stakeholders and hence the oil company.82 
The crux of the emotional equity proposition is hinged on the inevi-
tability of a shift from performance structured CSR to engagement. When 
people are engaged in such undertakings, they buy into the business’ corpo-
rate objectives and the sustainability of same, not because they are share-
holders, but because their attainment of their personal and community goals 
is tied to the existence of such business entities. It would appear the “neigh-
bour” principle established in the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson83 can help 
in delineating the province of stakeholders in this case. In this case, Lord 
Atkin put up a poser thus, “Who, then, in law is my neighbour?” and he 
went further to look at neighbours as “… persons who are so closely and 
directly affected by my acts that I ought reasonably to have them in con-
templation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts 
or omissions which are called to question.”84A neighbour in this case, to 
use Lord Atkin’s analogy, therefore includes any one or an interest that is 
capable of being affected by a particular business’ corporate policies and 
undertakings.  In other words, whoever stands to be affected by the usually 
out-stretched corporate hand in pursuit of its corporate mandate qualifies as 
a “stakeholder” and should be carried along in designing and framing CSR 
responses. Corporations must proactively engage with local stakeholders 
to determine their pressing needs, allow them to take part in framing CSR 
responses to ultimately reflect their inputs in the resulting CSR program. 
This will provide a sense of ownership for local communities to support and 
protect any resulting CSR program thereby reducing the usual scepticism 
associated with corporate CSR efforts. 
82 M Bowen, Ibid. at 1-2.
83 [1932] AC 502.
84 Ibid at 580, quoted in WVH Rogers Winfield & Jolowicz: Torts, (18thed, 2010, Sweet & 
Maxwell) at 158.
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5. CONCLUSION
Corporate and community interests in oil operations in the Niger Del-ta are not necessarily at cross-purposes. Since the IOCs’ exclusionary 
rule of engagement is changing for a stakeholder-focused engagement model 
through their CSR undertakings that would usher in a new inclusive re-
gime of engagement, stakeholders, whose interests range from economic, 
emotional attachment, etcetera, would help improve the relationship be-
tween the major stakeholders and hence enhance the prospect of corpo-
rate sustainability. As Peter Drucker suggested, the existence of operational 
challenges and particularly infrastructural needs of the communities can be 
moved from the liability column to asset column through CSR undertakings 
targeted at meeting some of these needs.  The active stakeholders: share-
holders and managements of the IOCs would benefit the most in the long 
run from such broad based level playing engagement. Since the cessation for 
almost a decade of oil operations in Ogoniland, governments, oil company 
(Shell) and the Ogoni communities have jointly lost billions of dollars be-
cause of lack of trust between the communities (of the one part) and Shell 
and governments (of the other part). There is need for re-engagement with a 
view to resolving the main concerns of the community so that exploration. 
Oil companies can make host communities emotional stakeholders by 
ensuring their active engagement and participation in designing and framing 
CSR efforts that would minimize environmental pollution, extend their hu-
man capacity training and deliver sustainable development. A stakeholder 
approach to CSR as discussed in this paper would make the communities 
consider themselves as having a stake in the sustainabilty of CSR efforts, 
knowing full well that CSR programs and plans were designed by them and 
for them.
